Showing posts with label natural resource curse. Show all posts
Showing posts with label natural resource curse. Show all posts

11/15/11

Summary Workshop Beyond the Resource Curse, 3-4 November 2011, Paris

On the 3rd and 4th of November 2011 I attended an exploratory workshop in Paris, titled “Beyond the Resource Curse: New Dynamics in the Management of Natural Resources: New Actors and Concepts”. Earlier I posted a short article explaining the topic of the workshop and shortly introducing the paper that I presented about UN targeted sanctions in Liberia, Angola, and the DRC Congo. It also contained a link to a short discussion article about China in Africa.

However, although my paper opened up some discussion, many of the other papers presented by different scholars were much more interesting. This post will summarize some of the articles presented and will comment on the research questions that were extracted from the discussion. On the one hand, I consider this post as an exercise for myself to get an overview of the workshop. On the other hand, for some readers it might also give an insight into which new issues have arisen in the resource curse debate as a result of rising powers such as China and India.

In the end, questions that have arisen at the workshop should form the basis of an online course for professionals and students. This course will be organized by the Network University and Modus Operandi and should start in 2012. The participants of the workshop will contribute by means of their papers and can act as moderators in the course. The papers I will discuss will follow the same order as in which they were presented at the conference, although not all papers are discussed.

The morning session on the 3rd of November concerned “New Players, changing international relations and new conflicts”. The presentations by Peter Konijn and Ashok Swain discussed the different views on China´s new role as a player in Africa. Konijn argued that there are three different ways of looking at China in Africa. Firstly, it can be seen from the ´scramble for Africa´ perspective, in which China is just another player trying to secure its energy security. Another perspective looks at China´s strategy and considers it a result of China´s domestic policies of economic development and non-intervention in other countries´ affairs. The third perspective rather looks at African governance and concludes that the way of dealing with external actors is well-established among African governments, and that this is hard to change.

Swain gave a more optimistic perspective and showed that China can also play a positive role as a game-changer in regional conflicts, by supporting the underdogs in for example hydro-conflicts.

The second morning session regarded issues of land grabbing and the politics of possession. Mathieu Perdriault and Rosemarie Wuite discussed land grabbing issues in several African countries and focused on the growing interests for available farmland. African states are often targeted because of the weak rule of law and the weak property rights of land. Companies have the power and knowledge to negotiate a profitable deal, while local populations are often fooled into signing deals that don’t benefit their interests. Finding ways to improve the negotiating position of local population is an important key to improving this situation.

Christian Lund addressed the issue of land from a more philosophical point of view and argued that property does only exist if it is acknowledged and if this acknowledgement is exchanged for legitimacy. In the cases at hand, this relationship between the legitimacy of the state and the property rights of locals is weak, giving countries like China the chance to step in and fill these holes. They grant authority to the state while buying the recognition of the property of land.

The first afternoon session regarded the impact of international monitoring schemes on authoritarian regimes, based on rentier economies and neo-patrimonialism. Gilbert Maoundonodji presented his experiences on the EITI in Chad in relation to the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Project, arguing that despite incidents around the governance of money, the initiative did contribute in promoting transparency. Francisco Strazzari argued that transparency initiatives such as the EITI have been a failure in the sense that they gather information on who pays what and what is done with the money, but that it does not create leverage for new power relations. In the end, the change has to come from the street, or from the bottom up, as protests in the northern Africa have shown.
In my own presentation, I argued that the use of UN targeted sanctions as a tool of dealing with conflict resources has not succeeded in persuading targets to comply with the UN´s demands. However, the targeted sanctions such as commodity sanctions did contribute to weakening those targets that financed their conflicts by exporting commodities for arms, with all the humanitarian consequences that came along with them.

In the second afternoon session, Adrien Roux and Sabine Luning discussed the issues of mobilizing local communities to stand up against the employers and the issue of take-overs and mergers of mining companies in Africa. First, Luning argued that TNC´s are difficult to pinpoint in terms of nationality and try to avoid issues of Corporate Social Responsibility. Roux coincided on this point but addressed the issue from a bottom-up perspective, explaining what his NGO ReAct does in order to mobilize communities to strengthen their negotiation position.

On the morning of the 4th of November there were two sessions, in which 6 presentations were given on “Changing state-society relations through tripartite governance of natural resources. Franziska Bieri explained how NGO´s contributed to the Kimberly Process by fulfilling the roles of experts, watchdogs, and legitimizers of the KP. Gavin Hilson explained how transparency initiatives have served the wrong goal by putting at ease consumers while not actually benefiting local miners. Steven van Bockstael had a similar argument and stated that artisanal mining should be seen as a result of poverty. It exists solely because mining companies don´t consider it feasible and because there are no other economic opportunities for people. Transparency initiatives such as the KP or EITI should not focus on artisanal activities, as the costs of the program in some cases are higher than the tax-benefits of the government.

Roy Machanochie presented a paper about a Diamond Development Fund in Sierra Leone that should enable development in diamondiferous communities. Unfortunately, much of the money goes to local chiefs instead of to the development projects it should go to. This illustrates how difficult it is for mining produce to actually benefit mining communities, also without the intervention of international companies.

Gilles Carbonnier discussed the general changes that improved or changed the effectiveness of several transparency initiatives and multi-stakeholder initiatives. The only times such initiatives have really been successful is when the resource-security or the image of western companies were at stake. Mostly, however, the multi-stakeholder schemes have suffered from free-riding problems and the lack of third-party independent watchdogs. Although some initiatives have strengthened the minimum requirements for participation and have set up guidelines to expel members, it has often been difficult to achieve real results that benefit local communities.

Finally, Global Witness´ Lizzy Parsons explained about the $9 billion deal between China and the DRC Congo. China has promised to build roads, hospitals, schools etc. as well as mining development in exchange for huge amounts of natural exports. Although the Chinese don´t seem totally against transparency, much of the deal was struck behind closed doors, making it difficult to judge on the fairness of the deal.
A full summary of the presentations and the questions that came up with regard to them can be found through the following link.

10/25/11

Workshop Beyond the Resource Curse: 3-4 November 2011, Paris

This November I will attend a workshop called "Beyond the Resource Curse: New Dynamics in the Management of Natural Resources: New Actors and Concepts. The workshop will be organized by the European Science Foundation, the University of Amsterdam, and Modus Operandi and will take place in Paris on the 3rd and 4th of November 2011.

The workshop will explore the new international and national power relations that result from a recent increase of demand from China and India. It will analyze the impact of the arrival of new players on international agreements and on state-society relations in resource-rich countries. My contribution will concern the effectiveness of UN sanctions on Liberia, Angola, and the DRC Congo.

Although the imposition of UN sanctions is not directly related to the rising power of China and India, these countries have an increasing impact on Africa. By 2007 the amount of FDI ($1,57 billion) was twenty times the size of that of 2003, only four years earlier. Although India has also increased its share in trade with Africa, their trade only represents about a third of the Chinese trade. Angola has become the biggest deliverer of oil to China, supplying China with 2.12 millions of tons of crude oil per month in 2006.

In return, China has invested heavily in projects of infrastructure, public buildings, housing, and agricultural projects like irrigation systems. As a result, Angola has also become Africa´s largest oil-producer, beating Nigeria with almost 2.000.000 barrels per day in 2009, although production has fallen to 1.6 million bpd in 2011.

For the workshop I have prepared a short discussion paper that discusses the impact of Chinese FDI on Africa. It argues that the Chinese strategy of investing in Africa differs from the Western way of investing in Africa. The main difference is that Western investments, much like aid, is given with several political conditions that focus on the development of institutions and the rule of law. Chinese investments rather go to more tangible projects such as the building of hospitals, roads, airports etc. The Chinese bring in lots of own laborers and do not discriminate between democratic governments and rogue states led by dictators. The full discussion paper can be found through this link.

My presentation at the workshop will however be based on an older article, prepared for a conference in Madrid earlier this year. It is based on my post-graduate thesis written at the University of Valencia and concerns the effects of sanctions in Angola, Liberia, and the DRC Congo. Although the role of China does not stand central in this paper, the increasing assertiveness of China has also changed the configuration of UN sanctions. The Chinese are not very fond of imposing sanctions or intervening in other countries´ domestic affairs. This has affected the way sanctions have been designed and implemented in the way that they have become ´weaker´ and that they have been imposed with a delay. My presentation at the workshop will address these issues and will be based on this article.

10/5/10

Sanctions and the Natural Resource Curse: Draft versions of 2 theoretical chapters

Dear reader(s),

Hereby a draft version of chapter 1 and chapter 2 of my 'trabajo de investigacion'. Comments are very welcome, both on the content and the style. I'm looking for a good way to connect the chapters, so if anyone has suggestions on that, please comment.

Chapter one is a summary of the most important literature on the natural resource curse and it's links to bad governance and conflict. As the case studies will later deal with weak and failed states, I have also included some important notions on the characteristics of weak states, the war-economy, and violent peace.

Chapter 2 deals with the sanctions literature. The first paragraphs deal with the theoretical notions on sanctions in general. They include notes on some articles on economic santions and comprehensive sanctions. Later, I shift to targeted sanctions, as they are more relevant for my case studies. The latter part includes some notions on arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and commodity sanctions.

Please do not cite any of the chapters, as they are draft versions that need to be revised and perhaps re-written. I've published them on my blog as a way of searching for feedback.

Chapter 1 can be found through this link.
Chapter 2 can be found through this link.


Best regards,


Thomas